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Free choice and homogeneity*
Simon Goldstein
Australian Catholic University
Abstract This paper develops a semantic solution to the puzzle of Free Choice
permission. The paper begins with a battery of impossibility results showing that
Free Choice is in tension with a variety of classical principles, including Disjunction
Introduction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Most interestingly, Free Choice
appears incompatible with a principle concerning the behavior of Free Choice under
negation, Double Prohibition, which says that Mary can’t have soup or salad implies
Mary can’t have soup and Mary can’t have salad. Alonso-Ovalle 2006 and others
have appealed to Double Prohibition to motivate pragmatic accounts of Free Choice.
Aher 2012, Aloni 2018, and others have developed semantic accounts of Free Choice
that also explain Double Prohibition.
This paper offers a new semantic analysis of Free Choice designed to handle the
full range of impossibility results involved in Free Choice. The paper develops the
hypothesis that Free Choice is a homogeneity effect. The claim possibly A or B
is defined only when A and B are homogenous with respect to their modal status,
either both possible or both impossible. Paired with a notion of entailment that is
sensitive to definedness conditions, this theory validates Free Choice while retaining
a wide variety of classical principles except for the transitivity of entailment. The
homogeneity hypothesis is implemented in two different ways, homogeneous alter-
native semantics and homogeneous dynamic semantics, with interestingly different
consequences.
Keywords: free choice, homogeneity, alternative semantics, dynamic semantics
1 Introduction
In the last few decades there has been a flurry of research into the apparent validity
of the ‘Free Choice’ inference, where sentences like (1) and (3) appear to imply
sentences like (2) and (4).1
(1) You may have soup or salad.
* Thanks to David Boylan, Simon Charlow, Melissa Fusco, Jeff King, Matt Mandelkern, Paolo Santorio,
and Dan Waxman. Special thanks to Fabrizio Cariani and Jacopo Romoli.
1 See von Wright 1968 and Kamp 1974, Kamp 1978.
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(2) You may have soup and you may have salad.
(3) Mary might be in New York or Los Angeles.
(4) Mary might be in New York and Mary might be in Los Angeles.
FREE CHOICE ♦(A∨B) |= ♦A∧♦B
Free Choice is a surprising inference from the perspective of a classical possible
worlds semantics for modals, and a Boolean semantics for disjunction. On that
theory, (1) simply says that there is some accessible world where either you have
soup or you have salad. This does not imply that there is both an accessible world
where you have soup and an accessible world where you have salad. For this reason,
semantic analyses of Free Choice have all offered some kind of revision to this
classical semantics.2
Free Choice also challenges a classical logic for possibility modals and disjunc-
tion, because it is incompatible with the validity of some other compelling inferences.
Kamp 1974 showed there is serious tension between the validity of Free Choice,
Disjunction Introduction, and the Upwards Monotonicity of possibility modals:
DISJUNCTION INTRODUCTION A |= A∨B
UPWARDS MONOTONICITY If A |= B, then ♦A |= ♦B
For suppose the entailment relation is transitive:
TRANSITIVITY If A |= B and B |= C, then A |= C
With these assumptions, Free Choice implies the equivalence of any two possibility
claims.3
EXPLOSION ♦A |= ♦B
Fact 1 (Kamp). Transitivity, Disjunction Introduction, Upwards Monotonicity and
Free Choice imply Explosion.
After all, ♦A implies ♦(A∨B) by Disjunction Introduction and Upwards Mono-
tonicity, which by Free Choice implies ♦B. So by Transitivity ♦A implies ♦B. For
2 For semantic accounts of free choice, see among others Asher & Bonevac 2005, Aher 2012, Aloni
2007, Aloni 2018, Barker 2010, Ciardelli et al. 2009, Charlow 2015, Fusco 2015, Geurts 2005,
Roelofsen 2013, Simons 2005, Starr 2016, Willer 2017a, and Zimmermann 2000.
3 Throughout I assume classical introduction and elimination rules for conjunction.
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Free choice and homogeneity
this reason, all existing accounts of Free Choice have rejected the inference from ♦A
to ♦(A∨B), by giving up either Disjunction Introduction or Upwards Monotonicity.
A semantic account of Free Choice requires major revision to a classical logic
and semantics for disjunction and modals. Any such account also faces serious
problems stemming from negation. Alonso-Ovalle 2006 presented what may be the
largest challenge for semantic accounts of Free Choice. Like scalar implicatures,
Free Choice seems to disappear under negation. While (1) implies (2), the negation
of (2) does not appear to imply the negation of (1). Quite the opposite: (5) actually
appears to imply (6):
(5) You can’t have soup or salad.
(6) You can’t have soup and you can’t have salad.
DOUBLE PROHIBITION ¬♦(A∨B) |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B
While the classical semantics above does not validate Free Choice, it does validate
Double Prohibition. If there is no accessible world where you have soup or salad,
there cannot be an accessible world where you have soup, or one where you have
salad, since you would have soup or salad in either such world.
There are several reasons to think Free Choice and Double Prohibition are
incompatible. First, suppose we accept Transitivity and Contraposition.
CONTRAPOSITION If A |= B, then ¬B |= ¬A.
Then Free Choice and Double Prohibition again imply that any two possibility claims
are equivalent.
Fact 2. Transitivity, Contraposition, Free Choice, and Double Prohibition imply
Explosion.
Proof. By Free Choice, ♦(A∨B) |= ♦B. So by Contraposition ¬♦B |= ¬♦(A∨B).
By Double Prohibition, ¬♦(A∨B) |= ¬♦A. So by Transitivity, ¬♦B |= ¬♦A and
hence by Contraposition again ♦A |= ♦B.
For this reason, the few defenders of both Free Choice and Double Prohibition (Starr
2016, Willer 2017a) have given up the rule of Contraposition.
But even giving up Contraposition isn’t enough to avoid further trouble. The
joint acceptance of Free Choice and Double Prohibition also requires further non-
classicality in the logic of disjunction. Consider the Law of Excluded Middle and
Constructive Dilemma:
LEM |= A∨¬A
3
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CONSTRUCTIVE DILEMMA If A |= C and B |= D, then A∨B |= C∨D
These two principles can be accepted independently of Disjunction Introduction.
But they also appear incompatible with the validity of Free Choice and Double
Prohibition.
For suppose we again accept that entailment is transitive. Then Free Choice,
Double Prohibition and the above assumptions lead to an absurd result, which we
can call the ‘Interconnectedness of All Things’:
IAT |= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B)
IAT is bizarre, because it seems inconsistent with the intuitive idea that there can be
two claims that differ with respect to their modal status. Unfortunately, it follows
from the assumptions above:
Fact 3. Transitivity, Free Choice, Double Prohibition, Constructive Dilemma and
LEM imply IAT.
Proof. By LEM, |= ♦(A∨B)∨¬♦(A∨B). By Free Choice, Double Prohibition,
and Constructive Dilemma, ♦(A∨B)∨¬♦(A∨B) |= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B).
So by Transitivity, |= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B).
To see the problem informally, suppose IAT is false, so that there is a situation in
which A is possible and B is not. It then seems that neither ♦(A∨B) nor ¬♦(A∨B)
can hold, since the former requires that both A and B are possible, while the latter
requires that both are impossible.
Summing up, Free Choice looks like an intuitively plausible principle. But vali-
dating Free Choice semantically comes with a variety of costs. Previous attempts to
validate Free Choice have given up a variety of classical principles, including Dis-
junction Introduction, Upwards Monotonicity, Contraposition, Double Prohibition,
LEM, and Constructive Dilemma.
In the face of these concerns, there are three natural strategies to pursue. Some,
like Alonso-Ovalle 2006, have accepted Double Prohibition but rejected the semantic
validity of Free Choice, instead offering a pragmatic account of its validity.4 Others,
like Barker 2010, have offered the reverse diagnosis, validating Free Choice while
offering a pragmatic account of Double Prohibition. Any such attempt, though,
still gives some of the classical assumptions in Fact 1. Finally, a few recent papers
(Aher 2012; Starr 2016; Willer 2017a; Aloni 2018) have offered new semantics for
negation, possibility, and disjunction that validate both Free Choice and Double
4 For pragmatic accounts of Free Choice, see among others: Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Fox 2007; Franke
2011; Klinedinst 2007; Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Romoli & Santorio 2017; and Schulz 2005.
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Prohibition simultaneously. Any such semantics requires some response to each of
the three incompatibility results above.
In this paper, I develop a new semantics for Free Choice that validates Double
Prohibition while avoiding all of the results above in a unified way. Every one of the
classical principles above remains valid, except for one: the transitivity of entailment.
To achieve this solution, the main theoretical insight is to introduce homogeneity
effects (von Fintel 1997; Križ 2015a) into the semantics of Free Choice. The key
idea is that disjunctive possibility claims are defined only when either both or neither
of A and B are possible.
(7) Mary may have soup or salad.
TRUE iff Mary may have soup and Mary may have salad.
FALSE iff Mary can’t have soup and Mary can’t have salad.
UNDEFINED otherwise.
By relying on homogeneity in the right way, we can straightforwardly validate
both Free Choice and Double Prohibition. Free Choice is valid because whenever
♦(A∨B) is true, either both or neither of A and B must be possible. If neither were
possible, then ♦(A∨B) would be false; so both must be true. Double Prohibition is
valid for the same reason. In order for ¬♦(A∨B) to be true, either both or neither of
A and B must be possible. If both were possible, ¬♦(A∨B) would be false; so both
must be impossible.
Once we incorporate homogeneity effects into our semantics, we can also intro-
duce a definition of entailment that is sensitive to definedness: Strawson entailment.
Here, an argument is valid only if it is truth preserving in contexts where the conclu-
sion is defined. Crucially, this notion of entailment allows us to preserve all of the
classical principles above, except the transitivity of entailment. To foreshadow, ♦A
implies ♦(A∨B), because to evaluate this inference we hold fixed the homogeneity
of the possibility of A and B. For the same reason, ♦(A∨B) implies ♦B. But these
inferences together don’t require that ♦A implies ♦B, because this last inference has
no homogeneity effect. The failure of Transitivity responds in a similar way to the
incompatibility results regarding Double Prohibition.
On first glance, one might balk at giving up Transitivity in the face of these
incompatibility results. One thing worth observing here is that the intransitivity
of Strawson validity is not an artifact of the semantics pursued here. For exam-
ple, if Strawson validity is adopted to characterize entailment in a language with
presuppositions, transitivity can fail in garden variety inferences involving definite
descriptions, Strawson’s original application. Consider:
(8) The King of France is either bald or not bald
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This is Strawson valid, and Strawson implies (9):
(9) There is a unique x that is King of France and x is either bald or not bald.
However, (9) is not itself Strawson valid.5
The last main feature of the proposal below is its generality. Homogeneity can be
incorporated into very different semantic frameworks, with quite similar results. In
particular, this paper develops two new semantics: homogeneous alternative seman-
tics, and homogeneous dynamic semantics. Each theory tells a different story about
the compositional origins of homogeneity. In homogeneous alternative semantics,
the effect is contributed by the semantics of possibility modals. In homogeneous
dynamic semantics, the effect is contributed by the meaning of disjunction. The
upshot is that homogeneity effects offer an attractive tool for a wide variety of
defenders of the semantic validity of Free Choice: many such theories can go on to
validate Double Prohibition and preserve much of classical logic by using a single
idea.
In §10, we critically compare the accounts developed here with extant pragmatic
and semantic accounts of Free Choice. The pragmatic accounts in Chemla 2008 and
Fox 2007 differ from the accounts here in at least the treatment of Free Choice when
disjunction takes wide scope to possibility modals and the treatment of duals to ♦
and ∨. In addition, we’ll review recent experimental work in Romoli & Santorio
2019 and Tieu et al. 2019 that seems to favor the present account. The semantic
accounts in Aher 2012 and Aloni 2018 differ from our own by departing further
from classical logic, giving up instances of the Law of Excluded Middle, Law of
Non-Contradiction, and Explosion. (Along the way, we’ll also consider the accounts
in Starr 2016 and Willer 2017a.)
2 Alternative semantics
In the first half of this paper, we validate Free Choice and Double Prohibition with
a new theory, homogeneous alternative semantics, that incorporates homogeneity
effects into alternative semantics. Let’s start by reviewing how alternative semantics
can be used to explain Free Choice, as in Simons 2005 and Aloni 2007.6 We then
enrich alternative semantics with homogeneity effects.
Throughout our discussion of alternative semantics, we’ll interpret a simple
modal propositional language.
Definition 1. L= p | ¬L | L∧L | L∨L | ♦· L
5 There is much prior work on failures of Transitivity, although generally not in the context of Strawson
entailment. See Smiley (1958), Tennant (1992, 1994), Ripley (2013, 2015).
6 For a helpful overview of alternative semantics, see Rooth 2016.
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The one interesting feature of this language is that it contains a special possibility
modal ♦· , whose interpretation is parametric to a choice of possibility operator ♦ in
the metalanguage. This contributes generality to the discussion below.
The crucial idea we’ll rely on from alternative semantics is that a disjunction
A∨B presents both of A and B as alternatives. To implement this idea, we let the
meaning of the disjunction A∨B be a set of propositions rather than a set of worlds.
In particular, the meaning of A∨B is the set containing the proposition that A is true,
and the proposition that B is true.
For this proposal to work, though, we also need a story about the rest of our
language. Here we’ll follow traditional formulations of alternative semantics and
generalize to the worst case, letting all sentences denote sets of propositions rather
than sets of worlds. We assume that atomic sentences denote the singleton of the set
of worlds where the sentence is true. JA∧BK performs intersection pointwise across
the alternatives from JAK and JBK.
Both ♦· and ¬ are operators that take a set of alternatives and flatten them, pro-
ducing a singleton set. J¬AK returns the singleton of the claim that no alternative inJAK is true. To validate Free Choice, we let possibility modals universally quantify
over the alternatives in their scope. We can theorize about this quantification in some
generality by deriving the meaning of possibility modals (♦· ) from an underlying
operator ♦—the ‘proto-possibility’ operator—which maps a proposition to a new
proposition. ♦ occurs in the meta language rather than the object language, and sim-
ply denotes some function or other from propositions to propositions. For example,
we might assume that ♦ is a usual Kripkean modal operator, which existentially
quantifies over accessible worlds (Kripke 1963; Kratzer 2012). Then we can letJ♦· AK return the singleton of the claim that ♦ can truly apply to every alternative inJAK. Summarizing, we reach the following first pass theory:
Definition 2.
i. JpK= {{w | w(p) = 1}}
ii. J¬AK= {W −⋃JAK}
iii. JA∧BK= {A∩B | A ∈ JAK,B ∈ JBK}
iv. JA∨BK= JAK∪ JBK
v. J♦· AK= {⋂{♦A | A ∈ JAK}}
Suppose the set of propositions in JAK is {A1, ...,An}, denoted by the sentences
A1, ...,An. Then ♦· A is true just in case each of the possibility claims ♦A1, . . . ,♦An
is true. In other words, the alternative sensitive possibility modal is a generalized
conjunction of a series of proto-possibility claims, distributed over the prejacent’s
7
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alternatives. To recycle one of our early examples, the truth-conditions of Mary may
have soup or salad demands the truth of both: Mary may have soup and Mary may
have salad.
To define entailment, we flatten the meaning of the relevant sentences. Arguments
are valid iff the union of the conclusion is true whenever the union of all the premises
are true.
Definition 3. A1, . . . ,An |= C iff ⋂
i∈[1,n]
(
⋃JAiK)⊆⋃JCK
This proposal guarantees that disjunction behaves as classically as possible. Since
entailment is only sensitive to the flattened form of a sentence, the alternative sensi-
tive disjunction or must satisfy Disjunction Introduction, LEM, and Constructive
Dilemma. In addition, the proposal yields the DeMorgan equivalence of A∨B and
¬(¬A∧¬B).
A further consequence of the above is that logical equivalence is less fine grained
than equivalence of meaning. While A∨B and ¬(¬A∧¬B) are co-entailing, they
do not have the same meaning. The disjunction, but not the negated conjunction,
denotes a set of alternatives. For this reason, our logic for possibility modals is
hyperintensional in the sense that substituting logical equivalents in modal preja-
cents does not guarantee equivalence of the resulting possibility claims. Possibility
modals with disjunctive prejacents go in for Free Choice, while modals with negated
conjunctions in the prejacent do not.7
Now let’s turn to the principles in §1. To consider Free Choice, note that we have
the following identity, regardless of what ♦ means:
J♦· (A∨B)K= J♦· AK∩ J♦· BK
This guarantees that Free Choice is valid. In addition, we already saw that Disjunction
Introduction is valid. Furthermore, since the consequence relation simply involves
preservation of truth, it is transitive. So to avoid the problems from Fact 1, this
semantics gives up Upwards Monotonicity. In particular, although A implies A∨B,
♦· A does not imply ♦· (A∨B). The reason for this is that in the inference from A to
A∨B, only the single alternative which combines A and B worlds is relevant, while in
the inference from ♦· A to ♦· (A∨B) the operator ♦· can access each alternative A and
B. (Below we develop a family of theories which validate Upwards Monotonicity.)
While Free Choice is valid in this semantics, Double Prohibition is not. For
consider a scenario in which ♦A is true and ♦B is false. In this case we have
¬♦· (A∨B), and so Double Prohibition fails. More generally, the validity of Double
7 Although see Willer 2017a for arguments that Free Choice occurs even in this case, and Ciardelli
et al. 2018 for a response.
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Free choice and homogeneity
Prohibition corresponds to the trivializing condition that any possibility claim implies
any other. Summarizing:
Observation 1.
i. For any operator ♦, ♦· (A∨B) |= ♦· A∧♦· B.
ii. For any operator ♦, if ♦A;¬♦B is consistent, then ♦· does not validate Double
Prohibition.
One last remark: the alternatives approach does not require that possibility modals
always go in for Free Choice. To avoid this result, we can introduce a closure
operation which flattens alternatives.
Definition 4. J!AK= J¬¬AK= {⋃JAK}
We can then allow this closure operator occur in the prejacent, generating the form
♦· !(A∨B). This would account for some localized failures of Free Choice, such as
(10) and (11).8
(10) Mary may have soup or salad, but I don’t know which.
(11) Mary may have soup or salad, but I won’t tell you which.
3 Homogeneity
In §2, we reviewed how alternative semantics handles Free Choice. We saw that in
addition to giving up the Upwards Monotonicity of possibility modals, the semantics
also invalidated Double Prohibition. Now we introduce our main idea: homogeneity
effects.
Homogeneity effects have been used to explain apparent violations of excluded
middle for both conditionals and plurals.9 In von Fintel 1997, homogeneity is
treated as a kind of semantic presupposition, involving undefinedness. In Križ 2015a
homogeneity is also treated as a kind of undefinedness, but with a different projection
pattern. For our results, we need not take a stand on this issue; but we need to rely
on Strawson entailment (as in von Fintel 1997).
Here is the problem: observe first that predications involving plural definites,
like (12), plausibly license inferences to universal claims like (13).
(12) The cherries in my yard are ripe.
8 See Zimmermann 2000 among others for discussion.
9 For discussion, see among others von Fintel 1997 and Križ 2015a.
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(13) All the cherries in my yard are ripe.
If some but not all cherries are ripe, one would not be in a position to assert (12).
Furthermore, plural definites plausibly accept the law of excluded middle. That is,
the following sounds like a logical truth:
(14) Either the cherries in my yard are ripe or they (=the cherries in my yard)
are not ripe.
If someone were to utter (14), they would sound just about as informative as if
they had made a tautological statement. The problem is that, starting with (14)
and exploiting entailments like the one from (12) to (13) as well as Constructive
Dilemma, we can infer (15):
(15) Either all the cherries in my yard are ripe or all the cherries in my yard are
not ripe.
That seems puzzling: did we just prove from logical truths and valid inferences
that my yard cannot have some ripe cherries and some non-ripe ones? Of course,
something must have gone wrong. The homogeneity view of plural definites explains
what that is: first, plural definites are defined only when either the F’s are either
homogeneously G’s or homogeneously not G’s. If this condition is satisfied, their
content is that all F’s are G’s. The sense in which (14) sounds tautological is that it
cannot be false if its definedness condition is satisfied. Similarly, the sense in which
(12) entails (13) is that if the definedness conditions of (12) is satisfied and (12) is
true, (13) cannot fail to be true. But even if we can exploit these to deduce (15) we
do not have license us to claim that (15) is valid: our justification for (14) and for the
(12)-(13) entailment did not discharge the homogeneity condition.10
There are a variety of reasons to think that Free Choice involves some kind of
homogeneity effect. The first observation here (paralleling Lobner 2000, Fodor 1970
on plural definites), is simply that free choice constructions generate truth value
gaps.
(16) Mary may have soup or salad.
TRUE iff Mary may have soup and Mary may have salad.
FALSE iff Mary can’t have soup and Mary can’t have salad.
UNDEFINED otherwise.
Second, Križ 2015a suggests we can observe truth value gaps in plurals by consid-
ering the proper response to plural assertions when undefined. In such cases, the
hearer cannot respond with yes or no, but must instead clarify with well:
10 See von Fintel 1997 for a similar analysis of conditionals.
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(17) Context: Half of the professors smiled.
A: The professors smiled.
B: Well / #yes / #no, half of them.
We can observe a parallel effect in the case of Free Choice.
(18) Context: Soup is permitted; salad is not.
A: Mary may have soup and she may have salad.
B: Well / #yes / no, she can have soup (but she can’t have salad).
(19) Context: Soup is permitted; salad is not.
A: Mary may have soup or salad.
B: Well / #yes / #no, she can have soup (but she can’t have salad).
(18) is a conjunction of possibility claims. When one of those conjuncts is false, a
speaker can felicitously deny the conjunction by saying no. By contrast, in the Free
Choice claim (19) it is harder to use no (unless metalinguistically) to deny Mary’s
permission to have soup or salad in a scenario where one of these items is permitted
and the other is not.
Finally, Tieu et al. 2019 has found further empirical evidence for a homogeneity
effect with Free Choice in particular. Tieu et al. 2019 ran an experiment in which
they gave participants a scenario in which Sue is only allowed to buy a boat, and
asked them to consider:
(20) Sue is allowed to buy the boat or the car.
(20) Sue is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
In addition, they gave participants a related scenario in which a character bought
both a boat and a car, and asked them to consider:
(21) a. Sue bought the boat or the car.
b. Sue didn’t buy the boat or the car.
In each case, participants heard a puppet assert one of the relevant sentences, and
then had to reward the puppet with a small, medium, or large strawberry depending
on whether the puppet was ‘totally wrong’, ‘in between, not totally right but not
totally wrong’, or ‘totally right’. They found that in the Free Choice vignette,
participants overwhelmingly rewarded the medium strawberry. By contrast, in the
case of ordinary disjunction, participants gave a mixed pattern of response to (21-a),
but overwhelmingly rejected (21-b). This has at least two upshots. First, in the case
of Free Choice Tieu et al. 2019 found exactly the pattern of responses predicted by
a homogeneity account. Second, Free Choice patterned quite differently than the
11
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kind of exclusivity implicature on display in (21-a). In this way, Tieu et al. 2019
offers both evidence of a homogeneity effect in the case of Free Choice, and a way
of distinguishing the homogeneity and implicature based accounts of Free Choice
(of which more in §10).
Križ 2015a argues that homogeneity in plural predication involves a distinctive
pattern of projection, involving a special kind of supervaluation over undefined
individuals which treats them alike. A natural next step would be to explore whether
Free Choice exhibits a similar projection profile. However, this paper brackets that
question. The problem is that it is unclear whether even homogeneity effects in
conditionals pattern like plurals with respect to projection (see Santorio 2018 for
discussion in the case of nonmonotonic quantifiers). So Free Choice might behave
more like conditionals and less like plurals in this respect, in a way that doesn’t affect
the present investigation. At any rate, this paper uses some kind of undefinedness to
solve the puzzle of Free Choice permission. This project could succeed even if the
pattern below isn’t quite the one for plural definites.
We now incorporate homogeneity effects into the semantics of Free Choice.
4 Homogeneous alternative semantics
We now develop a new semantics for Free Choice by integrating homogeneity
effects into alternative semantics. The key idea is that ♦· (A∨B) is defined only when
either all of the alternatives associated with A∨B are possible, or all of them are
impossible. The alternatives must be homogeneous with respect to modal status.
In homogeneous alternative semantics, we depart from alternative semantics by
introducing an undefined truth value #. Now instead of considering sets of worlds,
we consider total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}. The meaning of a sentence is
now a set of such total functions. Throughout, we’ll assume that the undefined value
# obeys a weak Kleene logic in the metalanguage. So in our semantic clauses we lift
the usual Boolean operators over sets of worlds into Boolean operators over total
functions from worlds to {0,#,1}. We suppose that whenever a function maps a
world to #, any Boolean combination of that function with another function also
maps the world to #.11
Definition 5. Where p and q are total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}:
i. p−q = λw : p(w) 6= # 6= q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) 6= 1
ii. p∩q = λw : p(w) 6= # 6= q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) = 1
11 ‘λx : f (x). g(x)’ denotes the smallest function mapping any x which satisfies f to 1 or 0, depending
on whether x is g, and which maps any other x to #.
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iii. p∪q = λw : p(w) 6= # 6= q(w) . p(w) = 1 or q(w) = 1
Now we can retain basically our semantics from before for the fragment not con-
taining ♦· , except in letting our meanings be defined relative to these more complex
Boolean operators.12 We can implement our theory of possibility modals by injecting
them with definedness conditions. ♦· A is defined only if either all alternatives in JAK
are possible, or all are impossible.
Definition 6 (Homogeneous alternative semantics). Let J·K map sentences to sets of
total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}:
i. JpK= {λw . w(p) = 1}
ii. J¬AK= {W −⋃JAK}
iii. JA∧BK= {A∩B | A ∈ JAK,B ∈ JBK}
iv. JA∨BK= JAK∪ JBK
v. J♦· AK= {λw : ∃v ∈ {0,1} ∀A ∈ JAK ♦A(w) = v . ∀A ∈ JAK ♦A(w) = 1}
Finally, to get our desired predictions, we need a definition of consequence. One lead-
ing candidate for languages involving definedness conditions is Strawson-validity
(Strawson 1952, von Fintel 1997, 1999, 2001). According to this notion, an argument
is valid just in case the conclusion is true whenever the conclusion is defined and the
premises are true. As in §2, we also assume that entailment is sensitive to the closed
forms of sentences.
Definition 7. A1, . . . ,An |= C iff ⋃JCK(w) = 1 if:
i. ∀i ∈ [1,n] ⋃JAiK(w) = 1
ii.
⋃JCK(w) ∈ {0,1}
We now have all of the tools necessary in order to solve the problems from §1. In
the next section we turn to this task.
5 Results
With all of our assumptions in place, let’s turn to the principles from §1. First, the
semantics validates Free Choice.
12 The precise projection patterns above aren’t necessary for our results, which would go through just
the same with Strong Kleene projection, or with the connectives in Heim 1992.
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Observation 2. ♦· (A∨B) |= ♦· A∧♦· B
Whenever ♦· (A∨B) is true, it is defined. If the sentence is defined, either ♦· A and
♦· B are both true, or they are both false. But the truth conditions for ♦· (A∨B) require
that at least one of ♦· A and ♦· B is true; so together this all requires that both are true.
Observation 2 follows from a more general property. Any inference that was valid
in the alternative semantics from §2 remains valid when enriched with homogeneity
effects. After all, homogeneous alternative semantics makes possibility sentences
true in the same worlds as in §2, provided that the sentence is defined. Furthermore,
it takes less for an inference to be valid in homogeneous alternative semantics, since
we can restrict our attention to the worlds where the conclusion is defined.
Since homogeneous alternative semantics validates Free Choice, it must respond
to Fact 1, which concerned the classical properties of disjunction. As in ordinary
alternative semantics, Disjunction Introduction remains valid, and for the same
reason as before.
Observation 3. A |= A∨B
Again, when we consider whether A implies A∨B, we restrict attention to the closed
form of A∨B (achieved by applying !), the worlds where one disjunct is true.
At this point, we have our first departure from traditional alternative semantics.
Unlike the theory in §2, homogeneous alternative semantics validates Upwards
Monotonicity. In particular, since Disjunction Introduction is valid, this theory
validates the inference from ♦· A to ♦· (A∨B), which some have thought is directly
incompatible with Free Choice.13
Observation 4. ♦· A |= ♦· (A∨B)
The definedness of the conclusion requires that either both or neither of A and B are
possible. Combined with the truth of the premise ♦· A, this means that ♦· B is true,
and so ♦· (A∨B) is true.
One might worry that this last result is too strong, because it fails to distinguish
the validity of ♦· A |= ♦· (A∨B) from the validity of Free Choice, which one might
worry is more intuitively compelling. In fact, our semantics can make this distinction.
For Free Choice is not merely Strawson valid. It is also flat out truth preserving, so
that whenever ♦· (A∨B) is true, ♦· A∧♦· B is also true. So although both Free Choice
and ♦· A |= ♦· (A∨B) are both Strawson valid, the marginal appeal of Free Choice
could still be explained.
Homogeneous alternative semantics validates Free Choice, Disjunction Intro-
duction, and Upwards Monotonicity. To escape Fact 1, this semantics gives up the
13 See Asher & Bonevac 2005 for discussion.
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transitivity of entailment. In particular, while ♦· A entails ♦· (A∨B), and this last
entails ♦· B, the premise ♦· A does not by itself entail ♦· B.
Observation 5. ♦· A 6|= ♦· B
Crucially, the first inference is only valid because we restrict attention to worlds
where the conclusion ♦· (A∨B) is defined. But this sentence appears nowhere in the
argument from ♦· A to ♦· B, and so this latter argument remains invalid.
We’ve now diagnosed how homogeneous alternative semantics escapes the first
incompatibility result from §1. Now let’s turn to the other incompatibility results,
involving Double Prohibition. Here, the first point to notice is that for any proto-
possibility operator ♦, ♦· satisfies Double Prohibition.
Observation 6. ¬♦· (A∨B) |= ¬♦· A∧¬♦· B
When ¬♦· (A∨B) is true, ♦!(A∨B) is false. This implies that A and B are both
impossible.
In §1, we saw that the joint validity of Free Choice and Double Prohibition
raises the danger of Explosion: that any two possibility claims are equivalent. In
particular, given Transitivity and Contraposition, Free Choice and Double Prohibition
immediately imply Explosion. For by Free Choice, ♦· (A∨B) implies ♦· B; so by
Contraposition ¬♦· B implies ¬♦· (A∨B), which by Double Prohibition implies ¬♦· A.
The semantics above accepts each of the relevant instances of Contraposition.
Observation 7. ¬♦· B |= ¬♦· (A∨B).
Here again, the key is that the definedness of the conclusion requires A and B to be
treated symmetrically.
To avoid Fact 2, homogeneous alternative semantics gives up Transitivity. While
¬♦· B implies ¬♦· (A∨B) and ¬♦· (A∨B) implies ¬♦· A, we do not have the first
premise ¬♦· B imply the last conclusion ¬♦· A. This is exactly parallel to our treatment
of Fact 1 above. When we remove the intermediate step ¬♦· (A∨B), we are no longer
entitled to restrict our attention to worlds where A and B are treated symmetrically.
Now let’s turn to Fact 3. This showed that Free Choice and Double Prohibition
seem to require further revisions to the logic of disjunction, giving up either the Law
of Excluded Middle or Constructive Dilemma. In particular, the concern was that
without giving up one of these principles, we would be forced to accept the absurd
‘Interconnectedness’ principle IAT, that (♦· A∧♦· B)∨ (¬♦· A∧¬♦· B) is a logical
truth.
Our semantics offers the same solution to this problem as with Facts 1 and 2.
First, LEM remains valid. In particular, we validate the potentially problematic
instance involving Free Choice:
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Observation 8. |= ♦· (A∨B)∨¬♦· (A∨B)
Here, one thing to consider is that Strawson entailment considerably lowers the
standards on being a logical truth. A logical truth doesn’t need to always be defined;
it simply needs to be true whenever defined. The instance above is only defined
when A and B are homogeneous, either both possible or both impossible. But when
defined, the sentence is guaranteed to be true.14
Likewise, the semantics above validates Constructive Dilemma, including the
instance used in the derivation of Fact 3. Here, the point is that applying Free Choice
and Double Prohibition to the two disjuncts above, we reach IAT.
Observation 9. ♦· (A∨B)∨¬♦· (A∨B) |= (♦· A∧♦· B)∨ (¬♦· A∧¬♦· B)
Crucially, however, while the premise of the above is a logical truth, the conclusion
is not. That is, we have another failure of Transitivity:
Observation 10. 6|= (♦· A∧♦· B)∨ (¬♦· A∧¬♦· B)
The IAT principle does not contain a disjunction under the scope of a possibility
modal. So the IAT principle does not trigger a homogeneity effect. So in order for
it to be a validity, it must be true at every world. But it fails at exactly the worlds
where the LEM instance above is undefined: where A and B differ in modal status.
In this section, we have seen that homogeneous alternative semantics provides
an elegant treatment of the incompatibility results from §1. With each result, the
semantics manages to validate all classical principles, with the exception of Tran-
sitivity. Most importantly, the semantics is able to deliver the joint validity of Free
Choice and Double Prohibition.
Before continuing, one note about the status of homogeneity is in order. Above,
we stayed agnostic about whether homogeneity is a presupposition, or instead a
14 Here we differ from Križ 2015a, who gives up the Law of Excluded Middle (see p. 47). Križ 2015a
motivates the denial of LEM on empirical grounds, suggesting that the following is invalid:
(i) Adam either read the books or he didn’t read them.
(ii) Well, what if he read half of the books?
Interestingly, the analogous argument in our case is unsuccessful:
(iii) Either you can have soup or salad, or you can’t.
(iv) ?Well, what if I can have soup but I can’t have salad?
So perhaps Križ 2015a’s approach is right about plurals, but not Free Choice. On the other hand,
nothing prevents Križ 2015a from accepting Strawson validity, where LEM would be valid.
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different kind of undefinedness condition as in Križ 2015a. But in the case of Free
Choice, there is at least some pressure to side with Križ 2015a against treating the
phenomenon as presuppositional. In particular, the homogeneity effect does not
seem to project from the antecedent of conditionals.15 In particular, (22-a) does not
seem to imply (22-b):
(22) a. If Mary can have cake or ice cream, we will have a blast.
b. Either Mary can have cake and Mary can have ice cream, or she can
have neither.
To predict this, we could rely on a conditional that differs from our Boolean op-
erations above by treating cases where the antecedent is undefined in the same
way as cases where the antecedent is false. Under any such flattening operation,
homogeneity effects are expected to disappear.16 17
We’ve now developed a plausible strategy for validating Free Choice with ho-
mogeneity effects. But the strategy developed so far has one significant deficit. Free
Choice occurs not only when possibility modals scope over disjunction, but also
when disjunction at least appears to take wide scope to possibility modals.18 For
example, (23) seems to imply (24):
(23) Mary might be in New York or she might be in Los Angeles.
(24) Mary might be in New York and she might be in Los Angeles.
WIDE FREE CHOICE ♦A∨♦B |= ♦A∧♦B
Homogeneous alternative semantics invalidates this inference, because Wide Free
Choice never allows an alternative-denoting sentence to scope below a possibility
15 Thanks to several independent referees for help here.
16 The relevant flattening operation is defined as follows:
Definition 8. J!AK= λw. JAK(w) = 1
J!AK and JAK map the same worlds to true; but any world mapped to # by JAK is mapped to 0 by J!AK.
Then we can invalidate the inference from (22-a) to (22-b) by giving a semantics for the conditional
which applies ! to the antecedent.
17 Another aspect of homogeneity is non-maximality: the truth of the team members look happy in
this picture is consistent with there being an ordinarily grumpy team member who is not happy in
the picture. For recent work, see Malamud 2012, Križ 2015b, Križ & Spector 2017. Interestingly,
Free Choice effects do not exhibit non-maximality. Križ 2015b observes that non-maximality also
disappears for small pluralities and explicit conjunctions.
18 See Zimmermann 2000 for a semantic account of Wide Free Choice, Simons 2005 for an argument
that apparent instances of Wide Free Choice actually involve narrow scope disjunction (and Hoeks
et al. 2018, Meyer & Sauerland 2016 for a response), and Willer 2017b for a pragmatic account of
Wide Free Choice.
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modal. For this reason, no homogeneity effects are triggered by Wide Free Choice
in this system. So ♦A∨♦B is always defined, and true at a world just in case there
is some accessible A world or some accessible B world.
We now show homogeneity effects are a tool that a variety of theories of Free
Choice can employ. In addition to alternative semantics, homogeneity effects can
also be incorporated into dynamic semantics. In this case, we can let disjunction
itself rather than possibility modals contribute the homogeneity effect, requiring that
either both or neither disjuncts are possible. This is not merely a proof of concept. It
validates Wide Free Choice.
6 Homogeneous dynamic semantics
In this section, we validate Free Choice and Double Prohibition within dynamic
semantics. To do so, we’ll rely on one simple idea: disjunctions require each disjunct
to be possible.19 That is, we need a semantics on which the following ‘ignorance
inference’ is valid.20
MODAL DISJUNCTION A∨B |= ♦A∧♦B
There is an intimate connection between Modal Disjunction and the validity of Free
Choice. To see why, suppose that we accept the T axiom, which says that anything
true is possible:
T A |= ♦A
Given the duality of might and must, the T axiom says that must is strong, so that
A implies A.21
Modal Disjunction follows from Free Choice, holding fixed the T axiom and the
transitivity of entailment. After all, the T axiom implies that A∨B |= ♦(A∨B). By
Free Choice, this immediately implies ♦A and ♦B.
We just saw that Free Choice implies Modal Disjunction, given a few assump-
tions. Similarly, given a few more assumptions Modal Disjunction implies Free
Choice. For suppose we accept the 4 axiom, so that anything possibly possible is
itself possible:
4 ♦♦A |= ♦A
19 See Zimmermann 2000 and Geurts 2005 for other implementations of this idea.
20 See Cariani 2017.
21 For discussion with epistemic modals see Karttunen 1972; Kratzer 1991; von Fintel & Gillies 2010;
and Lassiter 2016.
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If we combine the 4 axiom with the Upwards Monotonicity of ♦, Modal Disjunction
implies Free Choice.22 By Modal Disjunction, A∨B implies ♦B. So by Upwards
Monotonicity, ♦(A∨B) implies ♦♦B, which by the 4 axiom implies ♦B. So, sum-
ming up, if our possibility operators satisfy the T and 4 axioms, then Free Choice
and Modal Disjunction are equivalent.
Fact 4. Suppose Transitivity, Upwards Monotonicity, T and 4. Then Free Choice is
valid iff Modal Disjunction is valid.
We’ve now given some justification for our motivating idea, that disjunctions require
both disjuncts to be possible. Now we implement this idea within dynamic semantics
(in particular, update semantics).23 According to dynamic semantics, the meaning of
a sentence is not its truth conditions. Rather, the meaning of a sentence is its ability
to change the context in which it is said—its context change potential.
To give an update semantics, we need two things: a definition of information
states (or contexts), and an interpretation function which assigns a context change
potential to each sentence in our language. Veltman 1996 models an information state
as a set of possible worlds. Then an interpretation function assigns every sentence a
context change potential—a function from sets of worlds to sets of worlds. We also
follow Heim 1992 by relying on definedness conditions on updating. However, for
continuity with the above we model definedness with a special undefined state #, and
let our context change potentials remain total functions on the set of states. Finally,
we define an analogue of truth in a dynamic setting. Say that a state s supports a
claim A just in case A has no effect on s, so that s[A] = s. Support figures in our
semantics for disjunction and in our definition of entailment.
Definition 9.
i. W is the set of worlds w assigning truth values to every atomic sentence p.
ii. The set of states S contains every subset of W and the undefined state #.
iii. [·] assigns every sentence A a total function from S to S.
iv. s supports A (s |= A) iff s[A] = s.
Analogous with the previous section, we can extend the usual Boolean operations
over states to include sensitivity to the undefined state #. As before, we rely on a
weak Kleene notion of undefinedness in the metalanguage.
22 See Zimmermann 2000 for a similar observation.
23 See Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1982; Heim 1983; Veltman 1985; Groenendijk & Stokhof
1990; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991; and many others.
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Definition 10. Let −, ∩, and ∪ be weak Kleene extensions of the usual Boolean
operations:
i. a. ∀s,s′ 6= # : s− s′ = {w | w ∈ s,w 6∈ s′}
b. ∀s : #− s = s−# = #
ii. a. ∀s,s′ 6= # : s∩ s′ = {w | w ∈ s,w ∈ s′}
b. ∀s : #∩ s = s∩# = #
iii. a. ∀s,s′ 6= # : s∪ s′ = {w | w ∈ s or w ∈ s′}
b. ∀s : #∪ s = s∪# = #
We now extend a usual dynamic semantics for the connectives so that the unde-
fined state behaves properly. First, we assume that atomic sentences simply narrow
down an information state to the worlds where they are true. Next, we can hold fixed
the usual dynamic semantics for negation. On this proposal, updating an information
state with ¬A returns exactly the worlds that would not survive updating with A. As
in §2, our Boolean definition of set complement above leads to a smooth account of
the definedness conditions for negation. s[¬A] is just s−s[A], which by the definition
of complement above returns # whenever s or s[A] are #. For simplicity, we work
with a relatively static conception of conjunction, which intersects the result of
updating with either A or B, so that s[A∧B] = s[A]∩s[B]. Again, given the definition
of intersection above, this is undefined whenever s[A] or s[B] are.
The operations we’ve considered so far are in the business of narrowing down
the worlds in an information state. By contrast, modal sentences don’t give us new
information about what world we are in. Instead, they are tests, exploring properties
of the current state. ♦A explores whether s can be consistently updated with A. If
so, the initial state is unchanged by updating. Otherwise, the absurd state /0 results.
Again, however, we allow some updates in this system to be undefined. To get the
right predictions about Free Choice, we assume that updating with ♦A is undefined
when updating with A is undefined. To model this using our Boolean operations
from above, we simply union our usual update with s[A], which in this setting merely
imposes the extra definedness condition that s[A] 6= #. This gives us the meaning
s[♦A] = s∩{w | s[A] 6= /0}∪ s[A].24
All that is left is to give a semantics for disjunction, which implements the idea
that disjunctions require each disjunct to be possible, so that Modal Disjunction
and Free Choice are valid. Here is where we can again appeal to homogeneity. We
can say that the disjunction A∨B is defined only when A and B share the same
24 Proof: s[A] is either #, /0, or something else. In the first case, s[♦A] is #. In the second case, s[♦A] = /0.
In the final case, s[♦A] = s.
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modal status. Given our dynamic framework, this means that either the information
state can be consistently updated with each of A and B, or it can be consistently
updated with neither of them. Finally, when defined, [A∨B] then narrows down the
state to worlds where one of A or B is true. This theory of disjunction incorporates
homogeneity effects into the normal dynamic theory of disjunction, according to
which A∨B unions together the result of updating with each of A and B. When A
and B are non-modal, this results in classical truth conditions for disjunction, so that
updating an information state with A∨B narrows down the state to the worlds where
one of A and B are true. Now, however, we’ve enriched this idea with a homogeneity
effect, so that A∨B is only defined at information states that contain both A worlds
and B worlds, or contain neither A nor B worlds. Summarizing all we have said, we
reach the following definition:
Definition 11 (Homogeneous dynamic semantics).
i. s[p] = s∩{w | w(p) = 1}
ii. s[¬A] = s− s[A]
iii. s[A∧B] = s[A]∩ s[B]
iv. s[♦A] = s∩{w | s[A] 6= /0}∪ s[A]
v. s[A∨B] =
{
s[A]∪ s[B] if s |= ♦A∧♦B or s |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B
# otherwise
With our semantics in place, we need a definition of entailment. Here, we rely on
the notion of support (|=), and introduce a dynamic version of Strawson entailment,
which says that an argument is valid just in case any state where the premises are
supported and the conclusion is defined is a state which supports the conclusion.25
Definition 12. A1, . . .An entail C (A1, . . .An |= C) just in case s |= C whenever:
i. s |= A1; . . . ; s |= An.
ii. s[C] 6= #.
With our theory in place, we can now turn to the puzzles from §1.
25 See Veltman 1996 and van Benthem 1996 139-41 for other options.
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7 Results
Free Choice is valid in homogeneous dynamic semantics.
Observation 11. ♦(A∨B) |= ♦A∧♦B
Whenever s supports ♦(A∨B), s[A∨B] is defined. This in turn requires that either s
supports both ♦A and ♦B, or neither. But since s supports ♦(A∨B), we also know
that s[A]∪ s[B] is non-empty. So s supports both ♦A and ♦B.
Since homogeneous dynamic semantics validates Free Choice, it must also
respond to Fact 1, concerning the classical properties of disjunction. As in ho-
mogeneous alternative semantics, Disjunction Introduction is valid, although for a
different reason.
Observation 12. A |= A∨B
Here, the proof relies on Strawson validity, which allows us to restrict our attention
to information states in which A∨B is defined. When any such state supports A, it
also supports A∨B, since we can ignore the possibility that s contains no B worlds.
This system also shares another property with homogeneous alternative seman-
tics: Upwards Monotonicity is valid. Of particular interest for Fact 1: this theory
validates the instance of Upwards Monotonicity that uses Disjunction Introduction.
Observation 13. ♦A |= ♦(A∨B)
As in homogeneous alternative semantics, the definedness of the conclusion requires
that either both or neither of A and B are possible. Combined with the support of the
premise ♦A, this means that ♦B is supported, and so ♦(A∨B) is supported.
Again, as in homogeneous alternative semantics this theory also allows us to
distinguish the validity of ♦A |= ♦(A∨B) from the validity of Free Choice, which is
more compelling. Free Choice is not merely Strawson valid; it is also flat out support
preserving.
Homogeneous dynamic semantics validates Free Choice, Disjunction Introduc-
tion, and Upwards Monotonicity. To escape Fact 1, this semantics also gives up the
transitivity of entailment. While ♦A implies ♦(A∨B), and this last implies ♦B, the
premise ♦A does not by itself imply ♦B.
Observation 14. ♦A 6|= ♦B
Again, the first inference is only valid because we restrict attention to information
states where the conclusion ♦(A∨B) is defined. But this sentence appears nowhere
in the argument from ♦A to ♦B, and so this latter argument remains invalid.
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Homogeneous dynamic semantics has so far had the same results as homoge-
neous alternative semantics. The two frameworks differ, however, in the features of
bare disjunctions. Homogeneous dynamic semantics validates not only Free Choice
but also Modal Disjunction:
Observation 15. A∨B |= ♦A∧♦B.
We saw with Fact 4 that Modal Disjunction is equivalent to Free Choice given
Upwards Monotonicity, the T axiom, the 4 axiom, and Transitivity. All of the above
hold in this system except Transitivity. But while Transitivity fails in general, the
particular instances relevant to Fact 4 do not fail.
We’ve now diagnosed how homogeneous dynamic semantics escapes the first
incompatibility result from §1. Now let’s turn to the other incompatibility results,
involving Double Prohibition. First, one of the signature properties of this system is
that Double Prohibition is valid:
Observation 16. ¬♦(A∨B) |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B
Whenever ¬♦(A∨B) is supported, it is also defined. When it is defined, either A
and B are both possible or both impossible. So if ¬♦(A∨B) is supported, both A
and B are impossible.
In §1, we saw that the joint validity of Free Choice and Double Prohibition
increases the danger of Explosion, where any two possibility claims are equivalent. In
particular, given Transitivity and Contraposition, Free Choice and Double Prohibition
immediately imply Explosion. For by Free Choice, ♦(A∨B) implies ♦B; so by
Contraposition ¬♦B implies ¬♦(A∨B), which by Double Prohibition implies ¬♦A.
A first natural reaction to this result is to note that homogeneous dynamic
semantics gives up Contraposition in general. As in ordinary versions of update
semantics, A implies A (letting  be the dual of ♦), but ♦A does not imply A.
Nonetheless, this failure of Contraposition is not relevant to our second impossibility
result. The semantics above accepts each of the relevant instances of Contraposition
in that result.
Observation 17. ¬♦B |= ¬♦(A∨B)
Here again, the key is that the definedness of the conclusion requires A and B to be
treated symmetrically.
As in homogeneous alternative semantics, this theory avoids Fact 2 by giving up
Transitivity. While ¬♦B implies ¬♦(A∨B) and ¬♦(A∨B) implies ¬♦A, we do not
have the first premise ¬♦B imply the last conclusion ¬♦A. This is exactly parallel
to our treatment of Fact 1 above. When we remove the intermediate step ¬♦(A∨B),
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we are no longer entitled to restrict our attention to states where A and B are treated
symmetrically.
Now let’s turn to Fact 3, which placed Free Choice and Double Prohibition in
tension with the Law of Excluded Middle and Constructive Dilemma. Again, the
problem was that all together these principles implied IAT, that (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧
¬♦B) is a logical truth.
Here, our semantics uses the same solution strategy as with Facts 1 and 2. First,
LEM remains valid, including the following instance:
Observation 18. |= ♦(A∨B)∨¬♦(A∨B)
As in homogeneous alternative semantics, the key observation is that Strawson
entailment requires much less of logical truths. Rather than support at all states, we
only require the sentence to be supported at the states in which it is defined. The
above state is only defined at states which either contain both A worlds and B worlds,
or which contain neither kind of worlds. At any such state, the test imposed by
one of the disjuncts is passed. Likewise, the semantics above validates Constructive
Dilemma, including the instance used in the derivation of Fact 3. Here, the point is
that applying Free Choice and Double Prohibition to the two disjuncts above, we
reach IAT.
Observation 19. ♦(A∨B)∨¬♦(A∨B) |= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B)
Crucially, while the premise of the above is a logical truth, the conclusion is not.
That is, we again have another failure of Transitivity:
Observation 20. 6|= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B)
IAT fails spectacularly in this system: it is not only invalid, but inconsistent. That is:
whenever it is defined, its negation is supported.
For the same reason, Observation 19 only holds vacuously, because there is no
state where the conclusion is defined and the premise is true.
One might worry that homogeneous dynamic semantics rejects IAT in too strong
a fashion. Although IAT should not be a validity, it should be consistent. In the next
section, we generalize the system to account for other flavors of modals, like deontic
modals. This generalization predicts that IAT is consistent.
Finally, the semantics above generalizes smoothly to nested disjunctions. The
claim ♦(A∨ (B∨C)) is defined only if either all of A-C are possible or all are
impossible, and when defined asserts that the former condition obtains.
In this section, we have seen that homogeneous dynamic semantics provides an
elegant treatment of the logical incompatibility results from §1. With each result,
the semantics manages to validate all classical principles, with the exception of
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Transitivity. Most importantly, the semantics is able to deliver the joint validity of
Free Choice and Double Prohibition. So far, however, the reader may have a concern.
Homogeneous dynamic semantics seems tailor-made for epistemic versions of Free
Choice. But how can it extend to Free Choice for other flavors of modality? In the
next section we achieve this result.
8 Extension to other modals
So far, we’ve focused our discussion on epistemic modals. Here, we achieve similar
results for other flavors of modals. The upshot is that we can treat modals in a truth
conditional way and still reap the benefits of the above, provided that disjunctions
themselves use a dynamic kind of possibility operator.
Above, we appealed to possibility operators in two separate ways. First, Free
Choice involved embedding disjunction under some sort of possibility modal. Sec-
ond, our semantics had disjunctions themselves require that each disjunct be possible.
We’ll now see that these two appeals to possibility modals can be treated separately.
We can integrate a static semantics for deontic modals with our dynamic semantics
for disjunction in a way that validates Free Choice for deontic modals.
We introduce a possible worlds modal  into this system that is parameterized
to an underlying accessibility relation R, where Rw denotes the information state
made up of the accessible possibilities from w. Then we let A narrow down an
information state to the worlds w where Rw can be consistently updated with A. We
impose an extra condition so that this update is defined only if Rw[A] is also defined.
To implement this last condition, we union the overall update with Rw[A]∩ /0, which
has no effect when Rw[A] 6= # and otherwise produces #.
Definition 13. s[A] = s∩{w | Rw[A] 6= /0}∪ (Rw[A]∩ /0)
This semantics for modals allows us to model arbitrary flavors of modality. For
example, we can model Free Choice for deontic modals by appeal to a deontic
accessibility relation Rd , which relates any world w to the worlds that are consistent
with the normative rules at w.
Now we can retain our earlier semantics for disjunction, defined in terms of the
test operator ♦. But we can allow this dynamic disjunction operator to embed under
. The resulting theory validates Free Choice:
Observation 21. (A∨B) |= A∧B
For s supports (A∨B) only if for every world w in s, Rw[A∨B] 6= /0. But given the
semantics for ∨, this in turn requires that Rw |= ♦A and Rw |= ♦B, so that Rw[A] 6= /0
and Rw[B] 6= /0. Since w is arbitrary in s, this implies that s |= A and s |= B.
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To summarize, the crucial property needed here is that the following principle is
valid:
OUTER POSITIVE INTROSPECTION ♦A |= A.
The reason that we are able to validate this principle regardless of the structure of R is
that ♦ is a dynamic operator. ♦A predicates possibility of a body of information. But
because ♦A is dynamic, it can in principle predicate possibility of different bodies of
information, depending on the environment in which it occurs. So if ♦A applies to
the whole information state s, ♦A predicates epistemic possibility of A—consistency
with what is common knowledge, say. By contrast, when ♦A is embedded under
an information shifting operator, like , it has a different effect. Under , ♦A says
A is consistent with Rw. That is, ♦ says the same thing under the scope of  as 
says when unembedded. This sensitivity to local context is a hallmark of dynamic
semantics.
We’ve now seen that a truth conditional semantics for possibility modals can be
integrated into our dynamic semantics for disjunction in a way that also validates
Free Choice. Similarly, this revised semantics validates Double Prohibition. More
generally, this semantics has the same results as that in the previous section, with one
exception. In the previous section, we predicted that IAT ([♦A∧♦B]∨ [¬♦A∧¬♦B])
was not only invalid, but inconsistent. This seemed too strong, since for example
(25) seems like it could be true:
(25) Mary may have soup and Mary may have salad; or Mary may not have soup
and Mary may not have salad.
Here, our new semantics makes just the right prediction. IAT is still invalid, but is
also consistent:
Observation 22. (A∧B)∨ (¬A∧¬B) 6|=⊥
For example, consider a state made up of two worlds. At the first world, A and B are
both deontically permissible. At the second world, neither A nor B are deontically
permissible. This state supports (A∧B)∨ (¬A∧¬B), because each disjunct
holds at one of the two worlds.26
26 To reach similar results for epistemic modals, we could use the dynamic semantics in Goldstein 2018,
where epistemic modals are sensitive not only to the input information state but also to a world of
evaluation.
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9 Comparing the two accounts
We’ve now developed two different semantics that use homogeneity to validate Free
Choice and Double Prohibition. This section explores two factors that might decide
between these two systems.
9.1 Wide free choice
As we saw above, Free Choice also occurs when disjunction takes wide scope to
possibility modals.
WIDE FREE CHOICE ♦A∨♦B |= ♦A∧♦B
While this inference is invalid in homogeneous alternative semantics, the inference
is valid in homogeneous dynamic semantics. In homogeneous dynamic semantics,
homogeneity effects are contributed by disjunction itself. So ♦A∨♦B is itself defined
in s only if s supports ♦♦A and s supports ♦♦B. Since ♦ satisfies the 4 axiom, Wide
Free Choice is valid for the epistemic test operator ♦.
Things are a bit more complicated for versions of Wide Free Choice with other
modals. In homogeneous dynamic semantics, this involves the inference from A∨
B to A∧B. Unlike the narrow scope version, this inference’s validity turns on
properties of the accessibility relation associated with . In particular, the inference is
valid only if R is universal, so that whenever v is accessible from any w, v is accessible
from every w. For suppose v is accessible from w but not u. Now let s = {w,u}, and
let A be a claim true at v uniquely. s supports ♦A, since s[A] = {w} 6= /0. But s
does not support A, since s contains u, which cannot see v.
For this reason, homogeneous dynamic semantics allows that Wide Free Choice
is cancellable for deontic, but not epistemic modals.27
(26) You may take an apple or you may take a pear, but I don’t know which.
(27) You make take an apple or you may take a pear, but I won’t tell you which.28
In (26) and (27), Free Choice is cancelled: these sentences seem to have deontic
modals under the scope of disjunction. In homogeneous dynamic semantics, any
case with this form involves a modal being interpreted relative to a non-universal
accessibility relation. Here our account makes the kinds of predictions that were
tested in Hoeks et al. 2018, which found experimentally that narrow scope Free
Choice is accepted for deontic modals independently of speaker knowledge of
deontic facts, while wide scope Free Choice only seems to hold when the speaker is
27 A similar prediction is achieved in Zimmermann 2000.
28 See Kamp 1978 and Willer 2017b for discussion.
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treated as an expert about the rules. Finally, Simons 2005 suggests there may be a
few cases in which Free Choice can be cancelled even for epistemic modals. We can
explain these cases by proposing that sometimes the relevant epistemic modal is not
the test operator ♦, but rather  under an epistemic accessibility relation.
Finally, in homogeneous dynamic semantics there is no analogous way to cancel
narrow scope Free Choice inferences. These are valid regardless of the choice of
accessibility relation. But the narrow scope analogues of (26) and (27) (the sentences
(10) and (11) from §2) are equally compelling. We can then explain these cases by
suggesting that at the level of logical form they have disjunction taking wide scope
to , with a non-universal accessibility relation.
It is no coincidence that homogeneous dynamic semantics validates Wide Free
Choice. We know that homogeneous dynamic semantics is a modal theory of dis-
junction. But it turns out that Wide Free Choice is intimately connected to Modal
Disjunction. Given a variety of principles we have already explored, these two
principles are equivalent.
Fact 5. Suppose Transitivity, T, the 4 axiom and Constructive Dilemma. Then Wide
Free Choice is valid iff Modal Disjunction is valid.
Proof. For the left to right direction: by T, A implies ♦A and B implies ♦B. So by
Constructive Dilemma A∨B implies ♦A∨♦B. So by Transitivity and Wide Free
Choice, A∨B implies ♦A∧♦B. For the right to left direction: by Modal Disjunction,
♦A∨♦B implies ♦♦A∧♦♦B. By the 4 axiom, ♦♦A∧♦♦B implies ♦A∧♦B. So
by Transitivity, ♦A∨♦B implies ♦A∧♦B.
Together, Facts 4 and 5 create a bridge from Free Choice to Wide Free Choice. If we
hold fixed all of the assumptions from Facts 4 and 5, Free Choice and Wide Free
Choice are equivalent.
Just like Free Choice, Wide Free Choice also disappears under negation. To test
for this effect, we can embed instances of Wide Free Choice under negative attitude
verbs like doubts, which are intuitively equivalent to believes not. For example, (28)
appears to entail (29):
(28) Alex doubts that Billie might be in New York or Billie might be in Los
Angeles.
(29) Alex believes that Billie can’t be in New York and Billie can’t be in Los
Angeles.
WIDE DOUBLE PROHIBITION ¬(♦A∨♦B) |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B
Homogeneous dynamic semantics handles this data with ease. A state supports
¬(♦A∨♦B) only if either both A and B are possible, or both are impossible. The
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ordinary update of ¬(♦A∨♦B) rules out the former condition; so both must be
impossible.
The following table summarizes the pros and cons of the theories above.
AS HAS HDS
Free Choice ♦(A∨B) |= ♦A∧♦B + + +
Double Prohibition ¬♦(A∨B) |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B - + +
Wide Free Choice ♦A∨♦B |= ♦A∧♦B - - +
Disjunction Introduction A |= A∨B + + +
LEM |= A∨¬A + + +
IAT |= (♦A∧♦B)∨ (¬♦A∧¬♦B) - - -
Modal Disjunction A∨B |= ♦A∧♦B - - +
UM A |= B=⇒ ♦A |= ♦B - + +
Transitivity A |= B & B |= C=⇒ A |= C + - -
Contraposition A |= B=⇒¬B |= ¬A + + +
So far, we’ve considered one advantage of homogeneous dynamic semantics over
homogeneous alternative semantics: that the former but not the latter can validate
Wide Free Choice. Now we turn to one potential disadvantage: the interaction
between disjunction and quantifiers.
9.2 Quantifiers
Homogeneous dynamic semantics, and modal theories of disjunction in general,
face a prima facie difficulty when disjunction is embedded under quantifiers. For
example, consider (33):
(30) Every philosopher or linguist went to the party.
One might worry that homogeneous dynamic semantics makes a bad prediction about
(33): that it only quantifies over people who might be a philosopher and also might
be a linguist. After all, on the account above the open formula x is a philosopher or
x is a linguist should be defined only if either both claims are possible, or both are
impossible. Intuitively, however, (33) is false if someone who must be a linguist and
not a philosopher did not go to the party.
Of course, to understand this prediction we have to integrate the dynamic se-
mantics above with a semantics for quantification. I’ll now argue that when we do
so, the problem above disappears. If we extend our semantics in the right way, we
can predict that the disjunctive restrictor in (33) quantifies over all philosophers and
all linguists.29
29 This relates to observations in Büring 1998.
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Here we’ll consider a semantics for quantifiers that is a simplification of the
dynamic semantics in Groenendijk et al. 1996. For brevity, we’ll omit many details
of the semantics; but a full implementation can be found in Carter & Goldstein 2017.
One of the goals of this semantics is to make the right predictions about donkey
anaphora, so that (31) and (32) are equivalent:
(31) If a donkey is beaten, it is sad.
(32) Every donkey that is beaten is sad.
We’ll model universal quantification using a generalized quantifier ∀x that takes two
sentences as input, and we’ll model indefinites like a donkey with a special operator
∃x, which occurs within the antecedent of the conditional in (31). This gives us:
REDUCTION ∃xFx→ Gx |=|= ∀x(Fx)(Gx)
Our semantics lets contexts be sets of assignment-world pairs rather than just
sets of worlds. Then [Fx] narrows down the context to the assignment-world pairs
where the referent of x satisfies F. Crucially, [∃x] performs a non-eliminative update,
expanding the context so that any 〈g,w〉 pair in the current context is joined by any
pair 〈g′,w〉 where g and g′ differ only in the value of x. The operators → and ♦
retain their usual test semantics, so that A→ B tests that the context is unchanged by
B after being updated with A. Finally, we can simply define the sentence ∀x(A)(B)
directly in terms of ∃x and→, to achieve Reduction by brute force. Where g[x]g′ iff
g′ differs from g in at most the value of variable x:
Definition 14.
i. c[Fx] = {〈g,w〉 ∈ c | g(x) ∈V (F)(w)}
ii. c[∃x] = {〈g′,w〉 | g[x]g′ & 〈g,w〉 ∈ c}
iii. c[∃xA] = c[∃x][A]
iv. c[A∨B] =
{
c[A]∪ c[B] if c |= ♦A∧♦B or c |= ¬♦A∧¬♦B
# otherwise
v. c[♦A] =
{
c if c[A] 6= /0
/0 otherwise
vi. c[A→ B] =
{
c if c[A] |= B
/0 otherwise
vii. c[∀x(A)(C)] = c[∃xA→ C]
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With a simple dynamic theory of quantifiers and modals in place, let’s return to the
meaning of disjunctive quantified claims like ∀x(Fx∨Gx)(Hx). This sentence has the
same meaning as ∃x(Fx∨Gx)→ Hx. The key property here is that c[∃x(Fx∨Gx)→
Hx] explores whether c[∃x(Fx∨Gx)] is unchanged by [Hx]. Now c[∃x(Fx∨Gx)] is
in turn decomposed into c[∃x][(Fx∨Gx)]. c[∃x] expands c to allow x to refer to any
individual. c[∃x][(Fx∨Gx)] is then defined only if c[∃x][Fx] and c[∃x][Gx)] are each
non-empty. This requires that c[∃x] include some 〈g,w〉 where g(x) is F at w, and
include some 〈g′,w′〉 where g′(x) is G at w′. Since c[∃x] includes any possible value
of x, this reduces to the requirement that c include some world where something is
F , and some world where something is G. In other words, the disjunctive restrictor
only applies a possibility test to the global context; it does not place this requirement
on each individual one at a time. Finally, c[∃x][(Fx∨Gx)] narrows down c[∃x] to the
assignment-world pairs where x is either F or G. Summarizing, the whole sentence
is then supported by a context just in case (i) the context contains a world where
something is F, and a world where something is G; and (ii) every individual who is F
or G at any world in the context is also H. This is a perfectly reasonable prediction,
and avoids the concerns above. When someone who must be a linguist and not a
philosopher fails to go to the party, condition (ii) fails and (33) is false.
This theory makes the right predictions about the interaction between quantifiers
and disjunction. But without saying more, the theory makes the wrong prediction
about the interaction between quantifiers and epistemic modality. Beaver 1994 and
Groenendijk et al. 1996 note that if the overt epistemic possibility modal might is
simply understood as the test operator ♦ above, then we make some bad predictions.
For example, (33) and (34) quantify over everyone in the domain; not simply those
who might be linguists.
(33) Someone who might be a linguist went to the party.
(34) Everyone who might be linguist went to the party.
In a context where both linguists and philosophers are under discussion, bad predic-
tions result. To make the right predictions here, we can keep the same semantics for
disjunction, but offer a different semantics for overt epistemic possibility claims.
The crucial idea, building on a proposal in Büring 1998, is too let overt epistemic
possibility function as a kind of ‘quasi-distributive’ operator, ♦#, which updates
a state by first partitioning it into cells which agree on assignment functions, and
then applying the test operator ♦ to each cell. The result is that update proceeds
‘cell-wise’ rather than point-wise: cells which pass the ♦ test remain in the state,
while cells which fail the test are eliminated.
Definition 15. c[♦#A] =⋃{{〈g′,w〉 ∈ c | g′ = g}[♦A] | ∃w′ : 〈g,w′〉 ∈ c}
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Now (33) and (34) can restrictedly quantify over the domain of quantification,
because the restrictor ♦#Lx updates c to the union of cells where the assignment
function maps x to an individual that is a linguist at some world. (For more on this
meaning for possibility modals, and how it might be decomposed into more basic
operations, see Carter & Goldstein 2017.)
The crucial observation for our purposes is that while overt possibility claims
are quasi-distributive, the kind of possibility at work in disjunction is not. When a
disjunction Fx∨Gx occurs in the restrictor of a quantifier, the resulting quantification
is not restricted to individuals who might be F and also might be G. So even if the test
operator is not a good model of overt epistemic possibility, it still has an application
in the case of disjunction.
All that remains is to verify that Free Choice is still valid once we enrich
the meaning of overt possibility modals. The question is whether ♦#(A∨B) |=
♦#A∧♦#B. To see that this is so, note that ♦#♦A |= ♦#A. After all, the premise
♦#♦A partitions c into cells that agree on the value of all variables, and then checks
whether that cell supports ♦♦A. It does so just in case the cell also supports ♦A,
exactly what is required by the conclusion ♦#A. On the other hand, this account by
itself doesn’t guarantee Wide Free Choice. Here, the crucial question is whether
♦♦#A |= ♦#A. This condition fails exactly when ♦ and ♦# come apart. If the context
contains to candidates for x, d and d′, where the former might be F and the latter
cannot be, ♦♦#Fx leaves c unchanged, while ♦#Fx removes d′ as an option. Thus
♦#Fx∨♦#Gx implies ♦Fx∧♦Gx, but only implies ♦#Fx∧♦#Gx in contexts where
either every candidate for the value of x either can be F and can be G, or no candidate
can. One question, left for further research, is whether this requirement could itself
be achieved by imposing another kind of homogeneous definedness requirement on
the domain of quantification. Of course, when Wide Free Choice is tested on the
fragment of the language without variables, this subtlety can be ignored.
If we have a sophisticated treatment of quantification in dynamic semantics, we
can allow disjunction to be modal without making bad predictions about the way in
which disjunction embeds under quantifiers.
10 Comparison with existing accounts
10.1 Semantic accounts
This section briefly compares this paper’s theories with some existing semantic
accounts of Free Choice, including Aher 2012, Aloni 2018, Starr 2016, and Willer
2017a. While Aher 2012 and Willer 2017a resemble homogeneous alternative seman-
tics, Aloni 2018 and Starr 2016 instead resemble homogeneous dynamic semantics.
Each account differs in some interesting ways from my own.
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Aher 2012 gives an inquisitive semantics for deontic modals, in which sentences
are recursively assigned supporting and rejecting states by |= and |=. Deontic modals
are interpreted in terms of a special violation atom v, true at a world just in case the
rules are violated there (and supported[/rejected] by a state just in case true[/false] at
every world in it.)
Definition 16.
i. a. s |= p iff ∀w ∈ s : w(p) = 1
b. s |=p iff ∀w ∈ s : w(p) = 0
ii. a. s |= ¬A iff s |=A
b. s |=¬A iff s |= A
iii. a. s |= A∨B iff s |= A or s |= B
b. s |=A∨B iff s |=A and s |=B
iv. a. s |= A∧B iff s |= A and s |= B
b. s |=A∧B iff s |=A or s |=B
v. a. s |= ♦A iff ∀s′ ⊆ s : if s′ |= A then s′ |=v
b. s |=♦A iff ∀s′ ⊆ s : if s′ |= A then s′ |= v
Within this framework, the relevant notion of entailment for validating Free Choice
is preservation of support.
Definition 17. A1; . . . ;An |= B iff ∀s : if s |= A1, . . . , and s |= An, then s |= B.
Here, Aher 2012 is similar to homogeneous alternative semantics: Free Choice and
Double Prohibition are valid. To see why ♦(A∨B) |=♦A, suppose that s |=♦(A∨B).
Then every s′ ⊆ s which supports A∨B rejects v. Crucially, any state which supports
A supports A∨B. So every s′ ⊆ s which supports A also rejects v. So s supports ♦A.
To see why Double Prohibition is valid, suppose that s rejects ♦(A∨B). Then every
s′ ⊆ s which supports A∨B supports v. So s rejects ♦A.
Since preservation of support is transitive, we know from our earlier results
that it doesn’t contrapose. In particular, although ¬♦(A∨B) |= ¬♦A, we do not
have that ♦A |= ♦(A∨B). For this very reason, possibility modals are not upward
monotonic. The inference ♦A |= ♦(A∨B) fails despite the validity of Disjunction
Introduction.30
30 That said, we could enrich Aher 2012 with Strawson entailment, where an inference is valid when
any premise that supports the premises does not reject the conclusion.
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Aher 2012 differs from homogeneous alternative semantics in several respects.
One difference concerns the Law of Non-Contradiction.
LNC A;¬A |=⊥
Aher 2012’s semantics for possibility modals allows that some states both accept
and reject ♦A. Consider any state which rejects p and rejects v. In that state ♦A
and ¬♦A are both supported. So LNC fails. Finally, Aher 2012 focuses on deontic
possibility, with the analysis focused on a notion of violation that has no counterpart
in the epistemic domain.31 Summarizing, Aher 2012 agrees in many respects with
homogeneous alternative semantics. On the other hand, the account differs from
homogeneous dynamic semantics, since the account invalidates Modal Disjunction
and Wide Free Choice.
Aloni 2018 works within the same semantic framework as Aher 2012, but with a
different semantics for disjunction and possibility modals. On Aloni 2018’s proposal,
natural language or (∨+) is decomposed into an underlying disjunction operator ∨
enriched with a non-emptiness requirement NE. On the resulting semantics, A∨+B
is supported by s just in case there are two non-empty subsets of s which jointly
exhaust s where one subset supports A and the other supports B. Aloni 2018 then
relies on an ordinary Kripke semantics for possibility modals.32
Definition 18. Where Rw = {v | wRv}:
i. a. s |= p iff ∀w ∈ s : w(p) = 1
b. s |=p iff ∀w ∈ s : w(p) = 0
ii. a. s |= ¬A iff s |=A
b. s |=¬A iff s |= A
iii. a. s |= A∨B iff ∃t, t ′ : t ∪ t ′ = s & t |= A & t ′ |= B
b. s |=A∨B iff s |=A and s |=B
iv. a. s |= A∧B iff s |= A and s |= B
b. s |=A∧B iff ∃t, t ′ : t ∪ t ′ = s & t |=A & t ′ |=B
v. a. s |= ♦A iff ∀w ∈ s : ∃t ⊆ Rw : t 6= /0 & t |= A
b. s |=♦A iff ∀w ∈ s : Rw |=A
vi. a. s |= NE iff s 6= /0
31 See Aher & Groenendijk 2013 for more on the interaction between deontic and epistemic modals.
32 The framework is enriched with further complexities (for example, a designated information state) to
handle epistemic contradictions. For simplicity, I ignore these aspects of the view.
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b. s |=NE iff s = /0
vii. a. s |= A∨+B iff s |= (A∧NE)∨ (B∧NE)
b. s |=A∨+B iff s |=(A∧NE)∨ (B∧NE)
As in Aher 2012, Aloni 2018 defines entailment as preservation of support.
Aloni 2018 shares many of the predictions of homogeneous dynamic semantics.
Free Choice, Modal Disjunction, and Double Prohibition are all valid. s supports
♦(A∨+B) just in case there is some t ⊆ Rw which supports A∨+B, for all w ∈ s.
For such a t to support A∨+B, there must be non-empty subsets u and u′ of t which
support A and B. Since u and u′ are also subsets of Rw, we know that s also supports
♦A and ♦B.
Modal Disjunction is valid because epistemic modals quantify over worlds in the
relevant state. So if s supports A∨+B, there must be non-empty subsets of s which
support each of A and B. But this means that every world in s can see an A world,
and every world in s can see a B world.
Double Prohibition is valid, for suppose s |=♦(A∨+B). Then Rw |=A∨+B for
all w ∈ s. So Rw |=(A∧NE)∨ (B∧NE). So Rw |=A∧NE, and Rw |=B∧NE. So
Rw |=A and Rw |=B, for each w ∈ s. So s |=♦A and s |=♦B.
Next, Aloni 2018’s semantics has similar properties to our own with respect to
Wide Free Choice. Say that R is indisputable at s when any two worlds in s have the
same accessible possibilities. Wide Free Choice holds at any states with respect to
which R is indisputable. For suppose s supports ♦A∨+♦B and that R is indisputable
with respect to s. From s supporting ♦A∨+♦B, we know there are two worlds w and
v in s where Rw is consistent with A and Rv is consistent with B. This immediately
implies that Rw
′
is consistent with A and consistent with B for every w′ ∈ s.
It is not coincidental that Aloni 2018’s semantics has so many similar predictions
to those homogeneous dynamic semantics. Both theories embody the idea that
disjunctions are homogeneous with respect to modal status. For say that A∨+ B
is defined at s just in case it is either supported or rejected there. In the semantics
above, A∨+B is only defined in s when either both of A and B or neither of them
are consistent with s.
While homogeneous dynamic semantics and Aloni 2018’s system embody a
similar idea of disjunction, they do so in different ways. The most striking difference
concerns the logical status of the NE sentence (itself definable as >∨+>, with
>= ¬(p∧¬p)). Interestingly, this sentence is not accepted by the absurd state. This
gives the logic a curious property: the principle of explosion is invalid.
EXPLOSION A∧¬A |= B
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In particular, A∧¬A does not imply NE, since there is a state ( /0) which supports
A∧¬A without supporting NE. Since the disjunction operator ∨+ incorporates NE,
a similar failure of Explosion percolates down: for example, A∧¬A 6|= A∨+¬A.
This invalidity is striking, since it means that conjunctions are not always as strong
as the corresponding disjunction.
Finally, there’s an interesting architectural difference between both of the above
accounts and our own. In the accounts above, the properties of Free Choice under
negation are derived by appealing to two independent sets of alternatives: positive
and negative alternatives. By contrast, in homogenous alternative semantics the
meaning of a sentence is modeled in terms of a single set of alternatives: but each
alternative is trivalent. This architectural difference has empirical upshots. First, it
means that homogeneous alternative semantics makes the fairly strong prediction
that Free Choice effects do not occur with negated conjunctions. In a bilateral system,
we can simply stipulate that the negative alternatives for conjunctions are the same
as the positive alternatives for the relevant disjunction. In homogeneous alternative
semantics, this strategy is not available. As discussed in the next section, this may
be a desirable prediction, since Free Choice with negated conjunctions is a weaker
effect. Second, Aloni 2018 argues against unilateral systems on the basis of recent
work by Romoli & Santorio 2019. But our own unilateral system is richer than the
ones discussed in Aloni 2018, because our alternatives are themselves trivalent. As
discussed in the next section, this extra richness allows us to explain this data, which
other unilateral accounts struggle with.
Starr 2016 and Willer 2017a also offer semantic accounts of Free Choice. Starr
2016 offers a theory of deontic Free Choice on which modals dynamically update
preferences over possibilities. As in homogeneous dynamic semantics, Starr 2016
seeks to validate both Wide Free Choice and Free Choice, along with Double
Prohibition. Starr 2016 lets a context contain a set of preference orderings. Updating
a context with a deontic possibility claim ♦A involves two steps. First, the context is
tested to make sure that every preference ordering allows some A world. If this test
is failed, the absurd state results. Otherwise, the context expands to include not only
all the current preference orderings, but also any way of taking a current preference
ordering and refining it to include a top ranked A world. This non-eliminative update
interacts happily with an ordinary dynamic meaning for disjunction which takes
the union of both updates. In a non-eliminative setting, the union of two updates
is stronger than each update alone. ♦A∨♦B implies ♦A∧♦B because an update
with ♦A∨♦B involves non-eliminatively updating with both ♦A and ♦B. Starr
2016 validates ordinary Free Choice in another way, by generating alternatives out
of updating, and letting ♦ universally quantify over the alternatives generated by
A∨B, which include A and B. Finally, Starr 2016 validates Double Prohibition by
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appealing to a nonclassical negation ¬A which can reverse the preference orderings
induced by A.
This theory differs in several respects from our own. First, the analysis only
covers Free Choice in deontic modals; it does not extend to epistemic modals.
Second, the analysis is less classical than our own with respect to negation. In
particular, Starr 2016 seeks to invalidate both double negation elimination and the
duality of must and may. On this proposal, ¬¬♦A and ¬¬A are both weaker than
♦A. Finally, the theory may face a technical issue when ♦A∨♦B is evaluated at
contexts where A is permitted by all preference orderings, while B is not permitted
by all preference orderings. In such a context S, S[♦A] works normally while S[♦B]
crashes, because the test for ♦B fails. In that case, S[♦A∨♦B] = S[♦A], while
S[♦A∧♦B] = S[♦A][♦B], which is the absurd state. The result is that Wide Free
Choice may not actually be valid, since it only holds in contexts where the tests for
♦A and ♦B are both satisfied.
On Willer 2017a’s proposal, the meaning of a sentence is a pair of a positive and
negative update on states, themselves sets of alternatives or classical propositions.
When a state is updated with the disjunction A∨B, the result is a new state consisting
of the result of updating every input alternative with A, and the result of updating
every input alternative with B. Possibility modals test the state to ensure that updating
the union of alternatives in the state with the prejacent does not produce absurdity.
The result is that Free Choice is valid: s ↑ ♦(A∨B) is consistent only if the union
of alternatives in s is consistent with A, and is also consistent with B. This is just
what is required by s ↑ ♦A∧♦B. Like Aher 2012 and Aloni 2018 ,Willer 2017a
validates Double Prohibition by appeal to bilateralism, in this case by offering an
explicit definition of positive and negative updating. The negative update with a
possibility modal (or the positive update with the negation of a possibility modal)
requires that updating the union of alternatives with the prejacent is guaranteed to
only produce absurdity. Crucially, s ↑ ¬♦(A∨B) therefore requires that the positive
update with both of A and B produces absurdity. So s ↑ ¬♦(A∨B) coincides with
s ↑ ¬♦A∧¬♦B.
Willer 2017a generates a similar empirical profile to homogeneous alterna-
tive semantics. While Free Choice and Double Prohibition are valid, Wide Free
Choice is invalid. However, one significant difference between Willer 2017a and
homogeneous alternative semantics concerns the treatment of the DeMorgan equiva-
lent ¬(¬A∧¬B). Willer 2017a seeks to validate Free Choice even for this, so that
♦¬(¬A∧¬B) |=♦A∧♦B. However, as we discuss below, Ciardelli et al. 2018 argue
against exactly this. At any rate, this inference is invalid in homogeneous alternative
semantics. Another difference is that Willer 2017a relies on a quite different semantic
architecture, folding some kind of alternative semantics into a dynamic system. This
architectural choice leads to further differences in the logic. For example, Willer
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2017a preserves signature properties of existing dynamic theories, including the
inconsistency of the epistemic contradiction A∧♦¬A.
Some existing semantic accounts come close to homogeneous alternative and
dynamic semantics. But extant theories differ in various ways, including with respect
to Explosion and the Law of Non-Contradiction. In addition, existing accounts of
Free Choice do not rely on Strawson validity.
10.2 Implicature based accounts
This section compares this paper’s theories with two accounts of Free Choice,
Chemla 2008 and Fox 2007, where the inference resembles a scalar implicature.
Chemla 2008 gives a pragmatic account of Free Choice which appeals to sets of
alternatives. Utterances are interpreted relative to a variety of sets of alternatives. In-
terpretation is governed by a pragmatic similarity principle: treat similar alternatives
similarly. Two alternatives are similar when they are derived by replacing relevant
items in a similar way. An agent treats two alternatives similarly when she believes
one iff she believes the other.
Take a disjunction like A∨B. This sentence generates two relevant sets of alter-
natives. Chemla 2008 relies on a linear scale 〈>,∨,∧,⊥〉 which orders connectives
by strength. The members > and ⊥ are superweak and superstrong connectives,
which map their inputs to the ordinary tautology and contradiction. This scale gen-
erates alternatives for A∨B by replacement of ∨ with a scalemate. The resulting
alternatives are then partitioned into those stronger and weaker than ∨. This gives us
two sets of alternatives: {>}, and {A∧B,⊥}. In addition to a linear scale, Chemla
2008 relies on a second method of alternative generation: connective split. Any
sentence with a connective generates the alternatives that result from keeping the
left or right side of the connective. This gives us a third set of alternatives: {A,B}.
Chemla 2008 applies a similarity rule of interpretation to these sets of alterna-
tives: every member of a set of alternatives must be treated the same by the speaker:
either they believe every member, or they believe no member. In the case of a bare
disjunction, this first explains why speakers who assert A∨B do not believe A∧B.
By the similarity principle, they would believe A∧B iff they believe ⊥, which is
absurd. In addition, this rule explains why speakers who assert A∨B do not believe
A and do not believe B: the similarity principle says they believe A iff they believe
B; but if they believed both, they would also believe A∧B, contradicting the first
result.
Finally, Chemla 2008 strengthens the similarity principle to derive secondary
implicatures. At this secondary step, we require that for any similar alternatives
X and Y , the speaker believes: X iff Y . This strengthening is only applied when
consistent with the primary implicatures and the truth conditions. For example,
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applied to A∨B, we produce the secondary implicature that the speaker believes
¬(A∧B). For the secondary step this gives us that the speaker believes: A∧B iff ⊥.
Since they believe ¬⊥, this implies belief in ¬(A∧B). Now consider each disjunct
individually. The similarity principle implied the speaker believes A iff she believes
B. The secondary step would strengthen this inference to believing: A iff B. But this
step is blocked. For this step requires either believing A∧B or believing ¬A∧¬B.
The former state would contradict the primary implicatures of A∨B; the second step
would contradict its truth conditions.
Now consider Free Choice. ♦(A∨B) is also associated with three sets of al-
ternatives. First, the linear scale 〈>,∨,∧,⊥〉 generates the alternative sets {♦>}
and {♦(A∧B),♦⊥} via replacement and ordering by strength. Second, connective
split produces the alternative set {♦A,♦B}. The similarity principle first implies
the speaker doesn’t believe ♦(A∧B), since ♦⊥ is absurd. Likewise, it implies the
speaker either believes ♦A and believes ♦B, or believes neither. This primary impli-
cature can be strengthened into the secondary implicature that they believe ♦A and
believe ♦B, since the belief that: ♦A iff ♦B is consistent with the primary implicature
that the speaker doesn’t believe ♦(A∧B).
One significant empirical point of difference between Chemla 2008 and homo-
geneous dynamic semantics concerns the status of Wide Free Choice. ♦A∨♦B is
associated with three sets of alternatives. First, the linear scale 〈>,∨,∧,⊥〉 generates
the alternative sets {>} and {♦A∧♦B,⊥} via replacement and ordering by strength.
Second, connective split produces the alternative set {♦A,♦B}. The similarity prin-
ciple prima facie implies the speaker doesn’t believe ♦A∧♦B, since ⊥ is absurd.
This is where the problem arises. Chemla 2008 suggests Wide Free Choice arises
exactly when this primary exclusivity implicature is cancelled. Now turn to the con-
nective split alternatives. Similarity implies that the speaker either believes ♦A and
believes ♦B, or believes neither. When exclusivity is cancelled, strengthening can be
applied to reach the result that the speaker believes ♦A and ♦B. So, to summarize,
Wide Free Choice is predicted to hold exactly when the wide scope exclusive reading
of disjunction is absent. By contrast, in homogeneous dynamic semantics Wide Free
Choice is guaranteed. This prediction favors homogeneous dynamic semantics, since
You may have soup or you may have salad grants permission for both items even
when it suggests you can’t have both soup and salad.
Another difference between a homogeneous semantics for Free Choice and
Chemla 2008 concerns the status of Free Choice when we replace ♦ and ∨ with their
duals  and ∧:
DUAL FREE CHOICE ¬(A∧B) |= ¬A∧¬B
(35) a. You are not required to eat an apple and a banana.
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b. So you aren’t required to eat an apple.
Chemla 2008 predicts Dual Free Choice has the same status as Free Choice. By
contrast, neither homogeneous alternative semantics nor homogeneous dynamic
semantics make such a prediction. In each framework, conjunction is treated classi-
cally. So any alternative sensitivity contributed by  will be confined to disjunction.
The status of Dual Free Choice is controversial. For example, Ciardelli et al. 2018
argue against the validity of a closely related principle: ♦¬(A∧B) |=♦¬A. Precisely
this principle is implicit in Dual Free Choice, since ♦¬(A∧B) and ¬(A∧B) are
logically equivalent given the duality of ♦ and . But Ciardelli et al. 2018 suggest
the principle is invalid:
(36) a. Mary might not speak both Arabic and Bengali.
b. # So, she might not speak Arabic.
Similarly, Chemla 2009 found that while Dual Free Choice is inferred with some
regularity, the effect is not as strong as ordinary Free Choice.
A third difference between Chemla 2008 and homogeneity semantics concerns
disjunction under quantifiers. Chemla 2008’s theory predicts that existential quanti-
fiers in general generate an analogue of Free Choice:
(37) a. Some students will skip exercise A or exercise B.
b. Some students will skip exercise A and some students will skip exercise
B.
In §9.2, we extended homogeneous dynamic semantics with a dynamic semantics
for quantifiers. This validates a weakening of the inference above:
(38) a. Some students will skip exercise A or exercise B.
b. Some students might skip exercise A and some students might skip
exercise B.
To adjudicate between between Chemla 2008 and homogeneous dynamic semantics,
we could determine which of (38-b) or (37-b) follow from (37-a).
Now we’ll turn from Chemla 2008’s account to the theory in Fox 2007, which
explains Free Choice through a syntactic version of pragmatic exhaustification. In
particular, Fox 2007’s theory of Free Choice revolves around the availability of a
covert exhaustification operator exh, which functions to negate a set of alternatives.
For example, a simple disjunction like (39) is interpreted with the LF (40):
(39) I ate the cake or the ice-cream.
(40) exh(C)(cake∨ ice-cream)
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Alternatives are determined recursively from a set of alternative connectives to ∨,
which includes ∧, L, and R, the latter being constant functions to the left or right in-
put. This produces the alternative set C= {cake∨ ice-cream,cake∧ ice-cream,cake, ice-cream}.
exh says that cake∨ ice-cream is true, but that some alternatives in C are false. It
says cake∧ ice-cream is false, because it is the unique alternative that is innocently
excludable. An alternative in C is innocently excludable given cake∨ ice-cream just
in case it is in the intersection of the set of maximal subsets of C where negating every
member of that subset is consistent with cake∨ ice-cream. There are two such max-
imally strong subsets: {cake∧ ice-cream,cake} and {cake∧ ice-cream, ice-cream}:
their intersection is {cake∧ ice-cream}. The result is that exh(C)(cake∨ ice-cream)
is equivalent to (cake∨ ice-cream)∧¬(cake∧ ice-cream).
Validating Free Choice requires double exhaustification. Hold fixed a classical
semantics for ♦ and ∨. Where C′ = {exh(C)(p) | p ∈ C}, the Free Choice validating
logical form is (41):
(41) exh(C′)(exh(C)(♦(A∨B))
C′ includes just three alternatives: {♦(A∨B)∧¬♦(A∧B),♦A∧¬♦B,¬♦A∧♦B}.
Crucially, each of ♦A∧¬♦B and ¬♦A∧♦B are innocently excludable: their nega-
tions guarantee ♦A and ♦B when combined with the truth of ♦(A∨B).
This account of Free Choice makes a variety of empirical predictions that depart
from homogeneous alternative semantics and homogeneous dynamic semantics.
First, this account predicts Dual Free Choice (¬(A∧B) |= ¬A∧¬B) has the
same status as ordinary Free Choice. In particular, the logical form exh(C′)(exh(C)(¬(¬A∧
¬B)) has the same truth conditions as (41), and in particular guarantees ♦A and ♦B.
Second, the account differs from homogeneous dynamic semantics in the treatment
of Wide Free Choice (♦A∨♦B |= ♦A∧♦B). While that inference is valid in homo-
geneous dynamic semantics, the inference is predicted to fail in Fox 2007. (Here
Fox 2007 makes the same prediction as homogeneous alternative semantics).
One question for Fox 2007 concerns the status of Free Choice under negation (see
Aloni 2018 for discussion). In principle, negating the logical form exh(C′)(exh(C)(♦(A∨
B)) simply requires that either ♦A or ♦B is false, not both. If this is an available
logical form for (42), then Double Prohibition is not explained.
(42) You can’t have soup or salad.
To rule out this sort of logical form, Fox 2007 could appeal to an economy principle;
for example, perhaps only applying exhaustification when it produces a logically
stronger meaning, or only when it avoids extra ignorance implicatures. While this
strategy is in principle promising, one challenge is to make sure such an economy
principle does not rule out too many logical forms. For example, Simons 2005
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observes that Free Choice effects can occur even when both options are compossible.
For example, one reading of (43) allows that Jane may sing, Jane may dance, and
Jane may do both.
(43) Jane may sing or dance.
To explain this reading, Fox 2007 appeals to a more complex logical form. Where
C′′ = {A,B}, the relevant logical form is:
(44) exh(C′)(exh(C)(♦(exh(C′′)(A)∨ exh(C′′)(B)))
A challenge for Fox 2007 is thus to permit both doubly and quadruply exhaustified
logical forms without requiring either, and while ruling out exhaustification under
the scope of negation.
A final problem for both Chemla 2008 and Fox 2007, solved by either homo-
geneous alternative semantics or homogeneous dynamic semantics, comes from
Romoli & Santorio 2019. Romoli & Santorio 2019 explore the interaction between
Free Choice and presupposition projection. Consider (45):
(45) Either Maria can’t go study in Tokyo or Boston, or she is the first in our
family who can go study in Japan.
The first disjunct of (45) is the negation of a Free Choice claim, and the second
disjunct presupposes that Mary is permitted to study in Japan. Where C♦A represents
a sentence C with the presupposition ♦A, (45) has the following logical form:
(46) ¬♦(A∨B)∨C♦A
Romoli & Santorio 2019’s observation is that (45) does not presuppose that Maria
can study in Japan; this presupposition is filtered by the first disjunct. This sug-
gests Free Choice must be accounted for semantically. For on standard accounts of
presupposition projection, a disjunction A∨BC presupposes ¬A→ C. Given this
assumption, the presupposition of (46) is:
(47) ¬¬♦(A∨B)→ ♦A
This presupposition is trivial only if ¬¬♦(A∨B) |= ♦A. This is predicted by homo-
geneous alternative semantics and homogeneous dynamic semantics. By contrast, the
implicature based account in Fox 2007 predicts that negated Free Choice sentences
do not doubly exhaustify. But if double exhaustification is not present in logical form,
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a doubly exhaustified logical form cannot provide the local context for interpreting
the second disjunct of (45).33
11 Conclusion
Building on Santorio 2017, Cariani & Goldstein 2018 develop a version of homo-
geneous alternative semantics for conditionals in order to validate another com-
bination of principles that appear jointly inconsistent. They develop a battery of
incompatibility results, showing that Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents
((A∨B) > C |= (A > C)∧ (B > C)) is in prima facie conflict with Conditional
Excluded Middle (|= (A > B)∨ (A > ¬B)). Then using homogeneous alternative
semantics, they validate both principles, by giving up the transitivity of entailment.
Putting these papers together, the synthesis of homogeneity and alternatives (or
dynamics) provides a powerful tool with which to combat various results showing
that within classical logic various constellations of plausible principles are jointly
incompatible.
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